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Lethal Brands: How VEOs Build Reputations
Abstract
ISIS has run the most effective social media marketing campaign in history. In fact, violent
extremist organizations (VEOs) market their ideology and organizations to a global
audience in ways that rival even the savviest of conventional organizations. However,
applying marketing theory and methodology to study VEOs has not been done to date for
the security community. Thus, the goal of the present effort is to use a novel lens used to
apply the marketing strategies of conventional, for-profit organizations to examine the
impact of VEO reputation and legitimacy on VEO performance. We coded tactics used by
VEOs such as ISIS to establish a strong brand reputation, and examined the relationship
between branding strategies and markers of performance (e.g., recruitment and
fundraising) using a sample of 60 historically notable VEOs spanning a variety of
ideologies, cultures, and periods of peak performance. The primary contribution of
studying such a diverse sample of VEOs is the identification of how branding strategies can
predict recruitment of talented personnel, financial sources, and organizational capacity for
violence. Two key findings discussed are (1) VEOs market and differentiate themselves via
malevolently innovative attacks, and (2) even negatively-toned media coverage is related to
their long-term fundraising viability.
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Introduction
Over the span of one year, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has
become one of the most recognized terrorist organizations globally, and a
legitimate rival and alternative to al-Qaida Central.1 The former affiliate
separated from al-Qaida in 2014 following publicized disagreements between
the leaders. Traditionally, once a parent organization disavows an affiliated
organization, the former affiliate suffers in both performance and legitimacy.2
ISIS, however, has shown steady and sustainable increases in performance
and reputation over the past year. Since the split from al-Qaida, ISIS has
used strategic marketing to publicize high-impact and innovative attacks
(such as the video-taped beheadings of journalists) with low cost to the
organization.3 These tactics have led to numerous outcomes, such as strong
alliances with other violent extremist organizations, daily global media
coverage, recruiting large numbers of local and foreign fighters, establishing
strong and sustainable fundraising lines, and accomplishing organizational
objectives.
The success of ISIS over the past year highlights a critical aspect of
performance in violent extremist organizations (VEO) that has yet to be
empirically examined: Do marketing and branding frameworks that illustrate
successful strategies in conventional organizations apply to VEOs? This
question is timely, given the increasing VEO use of technology and media to
communicate with a global audience. In the following sections, the article
briefly outlines how marketing and branding strategies influence performance
in conventional organizations, and apply the frameworks to a sample of
historically-notable VEOs using a historiometric methodology and a
psychometric content-coding scheme. The article then discusses the
implications of these results, with emphasis on counterterrorism.

Violent Extremist Organizations
The term “violent extremist organization” (VEO) is used to describe a
collection of individuals who prescribe to an ideological or belief-based

Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brookings, December 1, 2014, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/profiling-islamic-state-lister.
2 Randi Lunnan and Sven A. Haugland, “Predicting and Measuring Alliance Performance:
A Multidimensional Analysis,” Journal of Strategic Management 29:5 (2007): 545-556.
3 Gina S. Ligon, Mackenzie Harms, John Crowe, Leif Lundmark, and Pete Simi, “ISIL:
Branding, leadership Culture, and Lethal Attraction,” START, November 2014, available
at: http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/isil-branding-leadership-culture-andlethal-attraction.
1
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mission and engage in violence in order to execute that mission.4 Due to the
covert nature of their activities, VEOs often have a degree of ambiguity in
their organizational boundaries.5 Despite this ambiguity, VEOs share many
characteristics with more conventional organizations, particularly within their
core leadership and top members.6 For instance, VEOs can be classified by
their organizational features, such as hierarchy, formalization, and
centralization, as well as in terms of performance, such as financing,
recruitment opportunities, and innovation.
In addition to features like structure, tactics, and operations, VEOs are similar
to other types of organizations in that their complexity, unique
characteristics, and continual evolution make it difficult to study them in a
controlled setting. Despite these limitations, there is a critical need to study
organizational trends and frameworks across VEOs in an empirical way, in
order to better predict strategic outcomes following counterterrorism efforts
and deterrence operations.7 Consequently, similar techniques employed to
study conventional organizations—using secondary, archival data and other
historical records suitable for these distinct populations of interest—can be
applied to VEOs.

VEO Marketing: Brand and Reputation
In addition to methodological and data collection techniques, the similarities
between VEOs and conventional organizations offer opportunities to use the
robust body of literature on organizational behavior garnered from businesses
and non-profits to develop and test models of performance in VEOs. One
such area that has shown strong predictive value in the private sector is
research illustrating how organizations market themselves and establish a
unique brand with implications for firm legitimacy, funding, human capital,
and innovation.8 The ways in which organizations differentiate themselves

4 Gina S. Ligon, Pete Simi, Mackenzie Harms, and Daniel J. Harris, “Putting the ‘O’ in
VEO: What Makes an Organization,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 6:1 (2013): 110134.
5 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
6 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization:
Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 415-433.
7 Edwin Bakker, “Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach,”
Journal of Strategic Security 5:4 (2012): 69-84.
8 David L. Deephouse, “Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration of Mass
Communication and Resource-Based Theories,” Journal of Management 26:6 (2000):
1091-1112.
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from competitors in terms of their brand influence perception among
stakeholders and competitors.9
An organization’s brand can be thought of as its personality—the stronger or
more distinct an organization’s brand is, the more likely it is that marketing
and promotional efforts will increase the organization’s reputation, which in
turn increases other facets of performance.10 Branding is achieved through
engaging in innovative marketing campaigns and strategic actions that attract
media attention, publicizing the organization’s mission and success, and
differentiating them from competitors.11 As the ISIS example suggests, VEOs
with similar ideologies may still have remarkably distinct brands that
differentiate them as unique from competing VEOs (e.g., al-Qaida).
Accordingly, marketing frameworks offer valuable theoretical support for
understanding the interplay between branding, reputation, and
organizational sustainability in VEOs.
In more conventional organizations, crafting a successful brand via media
coverage and innovation can lead to third-party endorsements (e.g.,
organizations see a surge in applicants and investments after recognition in
Forbes Magazine as a desirable organization via their ranking system), which
build a strong reputation for the firm.12 Firm reputation and legitimacy
garnered through third-party endorsements results in sustainable funding
lines with banks and investors, access to desirable markets, and opportunities
to co-brand with other notable organizations.13 Co-branding or aligning with
other organizations is an important outcome because it leads to wider global
influence, larger constituencies of stakeholders, and increases access to
resources such as training or human capital. In addition, stable funding lines
increase the organization’s ability to execute successful marketing campaigns
in the future. Therefore, marketing constructs found in conventional
organizational science literature are important to understanding VEO
performance because the cyclical nature of branding, reputation, and
performance tends to increase sustainability over time.

9 David L. Deephouse and Suzanne M. Carter, “An Examination of Differences between
Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation,” Journal of Management
Studies 42:2 (2005): 329-360.
10 Volina P. Rindova, Antoaneta P. Petkova, and Suresh Kotha, “Standing Out: How New
Firms in Emerging Markets Build Reputation,” Strategic Organization 5 (Feb 2007): 3170.
11 Ibid.
12 Charles Fombrun and Mark Shanley, “What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and
Corporate Strategy,” Academy of Management 33:2 (1990): 233-258.
13 Ibid.
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Malevolent Innovation
Firms conventionally build their brands and reputations based on innovative
promotional efforts to attract attention to their products and services.
However, given the destructive nature of VEOs, it is unclear how their
violence impacts organizational brand and reputation. In a recent model by
Gill and Horgan, malevolent creativity is described as a particularly useful
index of performance and may have implications for understanding how
organizations such as ISIS have rapidly become a global threat.14 While
traditional VEO performance is studied almost exclusively in terms of
lethality, that metric does not capture the full range of outcomes that have
implications for early warning signs of later VEO destruction.15 For instance,
as the recent Boston Marathon bombing suggests, lethality alone cannot fully
capture the impact of VEO performance and effectiveness. The bombing
resulted in three fatalities, which is a relatively low number of casualties when
compared to other high-impact terrorist attacks. However, the symbolic
nature of the target and attack were psychologically destructive to the target
audience and resulted in a renewed attention to the Jihadi brand. This
suggests that lethality alone may not be the only index that should describe
VEO performance.
Using a marketing framework, however, may link how malevolent innovation
(i.e., novel methods of destruction to people, property, and symbols of the
target group) results in greater organizational performance. Moreover, it is
widely known that one aspect of creating a strong brand in conventional
organizations is the innovation that firms use to draw attention from potential
recruits, customers, and investors. For example, brand managers spend
resources to creatively market their firm to stand out from others in their
industry (e.g., Coke versus Pepsi advertisements and public relation
campaigns). Given that VEOs operate in a violent domain, it is likely that
their innovation must also demonstrate increasingly novel and sophisticated
attacks to differentiate themselves in the marketplace of ideas. How that
malevolence relates to performance has not been tested empirically to date.

14 Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel T. Hunter, and Lily D. Cushenbery, “Malevolent
Creativity in Terrorist Organizations,” Journal of Creative Behavior 47:2 (2013): 125-151.
15 Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures
and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70 (April 2008): 437-449.
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VEO Performance
Relatively novel attacks such as the Boston marathon bombing and the videotaped beheadings of American journalists by ISIS tend to attract global media
attention, both positive and negative, that may create the same impact on the
organization’s reputation and brand as a high-lethality attack. The media
coverage allows VEOs to craft the narrative supporting their attack to further
establish their brand and spread their ideological message to potential
sympathizers and constituents. In addition, for VEOs to draw desirable
recruits such as foreign fighters or individuals with specialized skills, media
coverage places their brand foremost in the minds of potential members and
has been shown to influence radicalism.16 Similar to how marketing
campaigns are designed to establish brand loyalty among consumers, VEOs
execute innovative attacks as campaigns to draw media coverage and attract
membership and potential financiers. This suggests that malevolent
innovation may be a critical early indicator of VEO marketing (e.g., thirdparty endorsements, opportunities to co-brand, reputation) that may increase
the legitimacy and desirability of a VEO in the eyes of the potential recruits
and funders.

Present Study
Applying marketing constructs such as branding (e.g., malevolent innovation,
media attention) and reputation (e.g., external legitimacy, third-party
endorsements) to examine VEO performance in terms of recruiting and
fundraising has not been done to date. Thus, the goal of the present effort
drives three research questions:
Research Question 1: Do elements of organizational branding and
reputation extend to the domain of Violent Extremist organizations?
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between malevolent
innovation with other branding indices (e.g., media tone) and reputation
indices (e.g., organizational legitimacy) in the context of violence?
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between marketing efforts
and recruitment of talented members and revenue sources?

Robin L. Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic
Security 4:4 (2011): 167-190.
16
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Method
This research employed a historiometric method developed as part of the
Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR)
project, dedicated to examining predictors of violence and performance of
VEOs.17 Historiometry is a method that transforms publicly available,
qualitative historical records and applies quantitative analyses to measure
relationships in notable populations that may be otherwise difficult to study.18
The steps followed to develop a psychometrically-validated content coding
scheme, to gather and code the data using benchmarked rating scales, and to
test the hypothesized relationships are briefly outlined in the following
sections.

Sample
The sample was comprised of sixty historically notable VEOs, distributed
across regions (western and non-western) and ideologies. The sample was
also diverse in organizational structure (e.g., hierarchical and cell-based) and
size. Organizations were excluded if their height of peak performance
occurred prior to 1980, to ensure that sufficient data on the media strategies
of the organizations were available. Height of peak performance was
determined according to consistency of performance over time (e.g., attacks),
largest growth in terms of membership or financing, and relative stability of
organizational structure and leadership. Using three subject matter experts
with over ten years of experience in the field of extremist studies, we
identified organizations that met criteria outlined to capture a wide array of
VEOs (e.g., Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, FARC). Though the sample may be
considered small relative to research within other domains, the sample was
sufficiently diverse to examine whether the hypothesized relationships
between branding and performance are consistent across ideological groups
who employ violence to execute their mission.19

Data Gathering and Coding
Doctoral students trained in industrial and organizational psychology and
extremist organizations gathered academic, government, and media sources
Gina S. Ligon, “Organizational Determinants of Violence and Performance,” Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, available at:
http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/organizational-determinants-violenceand-performance
18 Gina S. Ligon, Daniel J. Harris, and Samuel T. Hunter, “Quantifying Leader Lives:
What Historiometric Approaches can Tell Us,” The Leadership Quarterly 23:6 (2013):
1104-1133.
19 Brian J. Phillips, “What is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical
Implications,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27:2 (2015): 225-242.
17
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to gather qualitative information about the marketing strategies (e.g.,
branding and reputation efforts) and the performance indices (e.g., recruiting
characteristics and fundraising sources) of each organization. In accordance
with best practices for coding of secondary sources, the research teams
divided into groups devoted to gathering marketing strategy data or
performance data to prevent mono-source and common method bias. The
search tactics were standardized across researchers to ensure that any
gathered data were from reputable sources and that sufficient data were
gathered. Each organization was then de-identified so that coders in
subsequent steps were not familiar with the groups.
A psychometric content coding scheme was developed using behaviorally
anchored rating scales (BARS) and objective indices of performance to
measure constructs related to branding and organizational behavior.
Constructs coded as BARS were measured on 5-point Likert-type scales with
benchmark exemplars for low, medium, and high performance indicators.20
All data were then coded by three trained raters and assessed for interrater
agreement according to within-group variance (rwg) and intraclass
correlations (ICCs). Agreement was above .80 on all constructs across raters,
which is the accepted criterion for research.21

Branding Measures
The most notable way for VEOs to brand themselves and attract media
attention is by executing attacks that are innovative, as well as highly effective
at psychologically influencing secondary and tertiary targets (i.e., some
attacks induce a high degree of fear to those not directly involved in the
attack). Thus, we assessed malevolent innovation by rating attacks from
VEOs to the extent to which an organization uses behaviors or actions that are
cruel or excessively violent, above and beyond their mission and relative to
other VEOs within their historical context. For instance, the video-taped
beheadings made popular by al-Qaida in Iraq under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
(and later, ISIS) show an element of psychological cruelty that supersedes
attacks measured solely by lethality. To assess this particular aspect of
performance, we used the Global Terrorism Database to sample attacks from
each organization during its peak performance period.22

Debnath, Sukumar C., Brian Lee, and Sudhir Tandon. “Fifty Years and Going Strong:
What Makes Behaviorally Anchored Ratings Scales So Perennial as an Appraisal
Method?” International Journal of Business and Social Science 6:2 (2015): 16-25.
21 Ibid.
22 Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Global Terrorism Database,” Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
20
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Using procedures outlined by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA)
of best practices for measuring branding and reputation via media, the
prominence of the organization includes indices of branding and promotional
efforts that refer to the organization’s global status, and are measured using
several 5-point Likert-type BARS.23 Media exposure refers to the amount of
publicity an organization receives globally (both Western and non-Western
media outlets). This construct was coded using a stratified sampling
technique to capture news sources from both Western and non-Western
media outlets, and then benchmarked proportionately within the sample to
reflect low, mid, and high amounts of media exposure. Media tone is
comprised of two scales measuring the extent to which the tone of media
coverage regarding the groups is positive or negative, respectively.

Reputation Measures
Organizations that are more innovative and establish a unique brand are
expected to have a stronger reputation, as measured by several BARS.
External legitimacy refers to third-party endorsements that reflect the global
threat an organization poses, and is indexed by the number of countries
designating that VEO as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (i.e., FTO
designation), which has been used in nascent research as an index of global
endorsements.24 Comparative reputation refers to the reputation and
legitimacy of an organization relative to competing VEOs (e.g., there are a
number of Jihadist organizations, but some are considered to be more
sophisticated than others, comparatively). Cultural reputation refers to the
perception of an organization within their regional population (e.g., Boko
Haram is considered a strong force within Nigeria). Finally, co-branding
refers to the extent to which the organization publicizes alliances with other
organizations within their ideology.

Performance Measures
As establishing a unique brand and strong reputation is most likely to
influence members as well as investors, two important aspects of performance
we examined are recruiting and fundraising. Recruitment strategies refer to

David Michaelson and Sandra Macleod, “The Application of ‘Best Practices’ in Public
Relations and Evaluation Systems,” Public Relations Journal 1:1 (2007): 1-14.
24 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” updated March 2015,
available at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm; Ethem Ilbiz and
Benjamin L. Curtis, “Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual Players: Obtaining
Global Counterterror Actor Types from proscribed Terror Lists,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 38:1 (2015): 39-61.
23
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the novelty and effectiveness of strategies used to recruit potential
sympathizers and members, particularly those with desirable attributes.
Organizations rated high on novelty use diverse messaging and tactics to
recruit specific members of interest, such as al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula’s (AQAP) magazines targeting female Muslims or Westerners with
access to desirable targets, or the Hammerskins’ use of their record label and
racist rock concerts to recruit youth.25 Organizations high on effectiveness
use tactics that are highly successful at recruiting desirable members (those
with access to resources, specialized skills, or other desirable traits).
Marketing should also relate to fundraising efficiency. Short-term
fundraising refers to strategies that have an immediate fundraising return for
the organization, such as bank robberies or successful ransom demands.
Long-term fundraising refers to sustainable fundraising strategies that lead
to income for the organization over time, such as legitimate business or
membership dues. Fundraising novelty refers to the diversity and innovation
an organization uses to raise funds, and was assessed by measuring each
fundraising stream on a Likert scale for creativity.

Results
In order to examine how branding and reputation may influence the threat
and success of VEOs, the authors conducted a series of descriptive statistics
and correlations among indices of branding, reputation, and performance. To
investigate research questions one and two, proposing that relationships
between malevolent innovation, branding, and reputation found in
conventional organizations are also predictive in VEOs, we examined the
intercorrelations among analogous indices (Table 1).
Table 1: Intercorrelations between Indices of Branding and
Reputation

Branding
1 Malevolent
Innovation
2 Media

M

SD

2.83

1.39

2.97

1.52

1

2

3

4

5

6

.60**

Esther Solis Al-Tabaa, “Targeting a Female Audience: American Muslim Women’s
Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda,” Journal of Strategic Security 6:3 (2013): 10-21;
Simi, Pete, and Robert Futrell, American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s
Hidden Spaces of Hate (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).
25
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Exposure
3 Positive
2.90 1.40
-.03
.19
Exposure
4 Negative
3.42 1.23
.71**
.52**
Exposure
Reputation
5 External
2.39 1.62
.51**
.62**
Legitimacy
6 Comparative
3.30 1.32
.62**
.69**
7 Cultural
3.89 1.26
.68**
.72**
8 Co-branding
2.73 1.45
.44**
.47**
Note: N = 60; * p < .05, ** p < .01, † p < .10.

-.20

.21

.39**

.20
.23†
.24†

.57**
.56**
.37**

.61**
.55**
.65**

.83**
.52**

Consistent with marketing frameworks in for-profit organizations, there are
strong, positive relationships between malevolent innovation, branding and
media prominence, and perceived reputation against and among comparable
organizations, as well as within their cultural group. In addition, malevolent
innovation, branding, and media prominence were related to higher external
legitimacy (FTO designations) and co-branding (strategic alliances).
Specifically, VEOs who co-brand with other VEOs and have higher external
legitimacy from foreign governments tend to also have much more media
exposure and a higher reputation comparatively and culturally. VEOs who
engage in the higher malevolent innovation tend to have stronger branding
and a more prominent reputation. For example, when the group Tawhid a’al
Jihad broadcasted the promotional video of the beheading of Daniel Pearl,
they gained a great deal of media attention—albeit negative attention (r = .71,
p < .01), which was followed by at least four countries designating the group
as an FTO (r = .51, p < .01). While this may have had an immediate negative
reaction globally, overtime the media attention that was received increased
the group’s brand and reputation via legitimacy.
Dissimilar to analogous relationships in conventional organizations, positive
media exposure has no impact on other facets of branding and reputation,
while negative media exposure does. Given that lethality, destruction, and
malevolence are common tactics of VEOs, this suggests that actions to gain
negative exposure result in several positive outcomes, such as a stronger
reputation and more access to valuable allies. Conversely, efforts by
organizations such as ISIS to reframe media exposure to highlight positive
aspects of their organization (e.g., offering food and infrastructure to the local
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population) likely have little influence on their overall reputation and
prominence.
Findings related to reputation demonstrate that malevolent innovation has a
strong relationship with both cultural (r = .62, p < .01) and comparative (r =
.68, p < .01) reputation. Thus, VEOs who engage in innovative attacks may
increase the desirability of other VEOs to align with them. It may also lead to
more distinct reputation against other VEOs, as is playing out currently with
the competition between ISIS and al-Qaida Associated Movements (AQAM).
Former AQAM affiliates such as Boko Haram have recently pledged loyalty to
ISIS following their increase in attack innovation, and coinciding with
AQAM’s overall decrease in innovation and attacks in the past year.
Preliminary analyses among performance metrics suggested that recruiting
efforts were related to novelty (r = .57, p < .01) and long-term fundraising (r =
.55, p < .01) for VEOs. However, short-term fundraising is not significantly
related to either novel or effective recruitment strategies, suggesting that
VEOs marketing themselves to desirable populations for recruitment may be
less likely to engage in more one-off fundraising exploits (e.g., bank
robberies) that may alienate potential members. Next, to investigate research
question three, investigating whether marketing frameworks that predict
performance in conventional organizations also predict performance in VEOs,
the authors examined the inter-correlations among branding, reputation, and
performance (creative and effective recruitment and fundraising) (Table 2).
The results suggested that high external legitimacy (i.e., FTO designation by
foreign governments) is positively related to long-term fundraising, but not
related to short-term fundraising. This may mean that designating a VEO as
an FTO hinders short term fundraising and political/ideological goal
achievement, but may lead to these organizations getting more novel in their
fundraising efforts, and eventually more sustainable in their business models.
For example, as ISIS gains legitimacy and controls more territory, they also
have more sustainable funding avenues available and, therefore, may rely less
on only short-term or illegal funding activities.
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Table 2: Intercorrelations between Branding, Reputation, and
Performance
Recruitment
Novelty
2.72 ±
1.38

Fundraising
ShortEffectiveness Novelty
term
2.90 ±
3.93 ±
3.35 ± 1.28
1.35
1.16

Longterm
3.47 ±
1.48

Branding
Malevolent
.41**
.52**
.41**
.28*
.35**
Innovation
Media
.55**
.61**
.62**
.29*
.48**
Exposure
Positive
.31*
.35**
.31*
.19
.31*
Exposure
Negative
.38**
.16
.38**
.16
.43**
Exposure
Reputation
External
.45**
.44**
.45**
.21
.59**
Legitimacy
Comparative
.39**
.44**
.51**
.41**
.51**
Cultural
.41**
.60**
.57**
.44**
.52**
Co-branding
.28*
.33*
.32*
.19
.49**
Note: Constructs are coded on 5-point, Likert-type scales. N = 60; * p < .05,
** p < .01.
The results also demonstrate strong relationships between external
legitimacy, co-branding, and media exposure with novelty and effectiveness of
recruitment. What is interesting about this finding is that effective
recruitment was measured for this effort as the VEO’s capacity to recruit
specialized, desirable individuals—not just sheer number of people. This
suggests that organizations that are seen as more legitimate and have greater
media attention are also able to better attract more sophisticated members,
who can later plan specialized attacks that gain greater media exposure down
the road. One example of this finding is Jemaah Islamiyah, who used its
relationship with al-Qaida (co-branding) to recruit more specialized weapons
experts, which may have led to the subsequent successful bombings in Bali.26

26 David Martin Jones, Michael L. R. Smith, and Mark Weeding, “Looking for the Pattern:
Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia—The Genealogy of a Terror Network,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 26:6 (2003):443-457.
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This set of coordinated attacks subsequently led to more prominence and
attention from foreign states.
Cultural reputation is strongly related to effectiveness in recruiting for
desirable populations, suggesting that VEOs with a stronger reputation and
prominence within their culture tend to attract highly skilled individuals
compared with organizations who have not established a reputation (garnered
from media coverage of innovative attacks) within their region. In other
words, when VEOs are perceived as stronger, more dominant representatives
of their people’s needs, they are more likely to also have more expert, talented
members drawn to them. In support of this, VEOs who engaged in the most
creative marketing to potential members tended to obtain more financial
support from investors. Overall, the results support the research hypothesis
proposing that marketing frameworks used to predict performance in
conventional organizations will be predictive in VEOs as well. The
implications of these results are discussed in the following section.

Discussion
A central concern of a VEO is how to grow and maintain the organization—
both in terms of followers and finances. Recruiting is a central component of
VEO leader decision making, resulting in a focus on branding, organizational
legitimacy, and creating a compelling narrative. Decisions are both made and
framed in relation to the brand, such as what alliances to endorse, what media
to use in recruiting, and what statements to make by key figures. For
example, ISIS has designated Abu Muhammad al-Adnani as the Chief Media
Officer, charged with delivering “official” organizational speeches and
approving media content such as the video Flames of War. With an emphasis
on the recruitment of foreign fighters from distinct regions, the branding that
al-Adnani uses creates waves of media attention—both positive and negative
in tone—and increases the overall reputation and legitimacy of ISIS.
When competing for funds against similar and regionally-co-located VEOS
(e.g., al Nusra Front) from revenue sources, ISIS has created a compelling
brand that is differentiated, endorsed, and increasingly legitimate. The
present effort highlights empirical relationships that indicate that marketing
matters for VEOs, and there may be early indicators of which VEOs will gain
momentum in terms of recruits and funders. Before turning to the
implications of these results, however, it is important to discuss the
limitations of the present effort.
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First, the authors only had access to secondary sources to assess marketing
impact. While examining reactions from actual recruits and funders based on
efforts to differentiate brand and reputation would have added more validity
to our findings, the method of inferring impact based on objective indices
(e.g., number of talented recruits, diversity of fundraising sources) has been
used extensively in the broader strategy and organizational literature to assess
marketing impact. Nonetheless, future laboratory-based studies should
examine reaction-level data from individuals after viewing marketing
campaigns from VEOs to gain a richer understanding of how such efforts to
highlight innovation, brand, and reputation influence at the individual level.
Related to this limitation, this study only examined correlations among the
branding and performance facets coded here. Though more complex models
may reveal intricacies among the data such as mediated relationships, the
authors were hesitant to draw causal directions without meeting the criteria
for inferring causation from traditional laboratory research. Future studies
may consider examining these constructs using time series data in case
studies or small samples, in order to begin testing directional relationships
among metrics examined here.
Second, the present study only examined one organizational strategy—
malevolent innovation of attacks—as a precursor to brand and reputation.
However, signaling theory dictates that there are a number of approaches that
organizations can use to increase the status of their brand and reputation.
For example, organizations with “celebrity CEOs” tend to have more media
attention due to the relative inimitability of that strategic resource.27 Thus, it
may hold that VEOs with leaders who are unique (i.e., making efforts to
differentiate themselves from other leaders) also have a strategic advantage to
be leveraged in organizational marketing efforts. Future studies should
broaden their examination of other organizational strategies to heighten VEO
brand and reputation. For instance, though this article did not examine social
media use as a component of this research, a recent social network analysis of
twitter feeds managed by ISIS revealed that social media has been
instrumental in driving communication between core ISIS leadership and
local and foreign fighters.28 Other research has cited the increasing
popularity of YouTube and Instagram among VEOs to share video content,

27 Violina P. Rindova, Timothy G. Pollock and Mathew L. A. Hayward, “Celebrity Firms:
The Social Construction of Market,” Academy of Management Review 31:1 (2006): 5071.
28 Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign
Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38:1 (2015): 1-22.
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departing from the historical trend to release video content to traditional
media outlets (i.e., news outlets).29 Therefore, as the communication medium
for conventional organizations evolves to include popular technology
platforms, VEOs may transition to similar tactics in order to build an online
reputation and to recruit new generations of fighters. These platforms also
offer opportunities for advancements in counter-messaging from
governments seeking to dissuade sympathy for VEO missions.

Conclusion and Implications for Counterterrorism
Despite these limitations, conclusions from the present effort yielded at least
three important implications for counterterrorism. First, malevolent
innovation, as measured by attack cruelty above and beyond current norms
that is executed in a novel and surprising way, is one important way that
VEOs market themselves. By creating the impression that they are able to
execute coordinated and sophisticated attacks, they create a brand that is seen
as legitimate, differentiated, and unique. In addition, the novelty of attacks
cannot be underestimated in terms of impact; resulting media attention—
both positive and negative—can lead to potential recruits having a greater
affinity for the organization, as witnessed by the recent foreign fighter
phenomenon with ISIS. It may be that the increased media attention and
firm legitimacy garnered after they leveraged increasingly sophisticated and
cruel attacks created a cognitive opening among sympathizers for recruiters to
persuade individuals to join the organization. Thus, an important implication
of this work is that when VEOs send messages of rarity, inimitability, and
novelty via marketing of cruel attacks, they may also be more likely to grow in
size and long-term funding security over time. VEO branding and reputation
efforts can be used as other indices for threat assessment given this finding.
Second, any media may be “good media” for a VEO. While conventional
studies of branding have indicated that the more positive in tone different
media reports are, the greater increase in funding, the results of the present
effort indicate that negative tone is most related to long-term fundraising
viability. This was a surprising finding as it seems that unusually cruel
attacks and the negative media coverage that follows seems to marginalize
more moderate followers and thus likely dampen donations from such
sources. However, the converse appears to be found in the present results;
attack cruelty and malevolent innovation was strongly related to negative
media reports and also to long-term fundraising sources (e.g., the acquisition
Gabriel Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media (Washington, D.C.: Commons Lab
of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014).
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of legitimate business, member donations). The implications for
understanding the relationship between financiers of terrorism and acts of
terrorism are important; it may be that the psychological impact of attacks
(e.g., the video-taped beheadings by ISIS created a global media buzz about
the organization) sends a message to investors similar to the way pricing and
product design send signals to investors in conventional organizations of firm
viability and likely sustainability.
Finally, while marketing theory can be used to understand how VEOs brand
and increase their reputation among recruits and investors, it stands to
reason that it also can be used to develop counter-messaging and counternarratives for VEO recruitment and fundraising. When VEOs engage in
attacks that show a high degree of malevolent innovation, publicizing the
rarity, complexity, and sophistication of these attacks serves as a marketing
campaign for the organization. Thus, it seems that a counter-narrative that
denigrates the organizational legitimacy (e.g., highlighting similarity among
VEOs, downplaying unique/novel attacks) would counter the swell of
enthusiasm that a ‘Chief Media Officer’ like al-Adnani seeks to create. In
addition, capitalizing on “branding mistakes” of VEOs may also prove useful
for countering violent extremism in social media.
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